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The Collision Between
New Discovery Amendments
and Expert Testimony Rules
by Paul F. Rothstein
The young litigator's nightmare was always the same. He was
in medieval Europe, ready to engage in a sword fight with the
expert swordsman representing his arch rival. After countless
hours of preparation, he felt confident that he would be able to
hold his own against the swordsman. But when the swordsman drew his lengthy rapier from its sheath, the young
attorney pulled only a short dagger from his scabbard. Realizing that he was doomed to defeat, he tossed his dagger into
the air and ran from the scene with the laughter of the
onlookers ringing in his ears.
The young litigator needed no dream analyst to tell him the
nightmare's symbolism. He knew that the sword fight represented cross-examination and that his swordsman opponent
was simply an expert witness. As hard as he practiced and
studied and researched, he never felt comfortable crossexamining his opponent's expert about the expert's field of
expertise. He might as well admit his failure now and become
a tax attorney, he thought. .
Fear of expert witnesses can indeed be disabling. With the
increase in litigation about complex business transactions,
products liability, and professional malpractice, expert testimony continues to become more important. The modern
litigator must learn to deal effectively with opposing experts
or be faced with the embarrassment of his worst nightmares.
Handling the opponent's expert has become more difficult
because the rules of evidence have been liberalized over the
years, while the rules of discovery recently have been restricted.
Relaxing the evidentiary rules has increased the scope of
expert trial testimony. Matters formerly thought to be solely
in the province of the jury have become a kind of star warsan intense courtroom battle between stellar experts in their
fields. At the same time, restrictions on discovery about expert
witnesses make it more difficult to cross-examine experts
effectively.
Mr. Rothstein is a professor of law at Georgetown University Law Center,
Washington, D.C.
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Expert witnesses provide valuable assistance to the triersof-fact, but unscrupulous "hired guns" can hoodwink them.
Sadly, the full disclosure essential to sort the charlatans from
the genuine experts often falls victim to the move to restrict
discovery. Either the balance must be struck between pretrial
disclosure and evidentiary rules at trial, or control of the
courtroom must be relinquished to those who have become
expert at testifying.
Typical of modern evidentiary provisions encouraging the
broad use of experts is Article VII of the Federal Rules of
Evidence. Article VII-and indeed, most of the Federal Rules
of Evidence-is copied by the evidence codes and the rulings
of most states.
Article VII relaxes former restrictions on the use of experts
in the following ways:
( 1) A lay witness may give opinions and conclusions if they
are rationally based on the witness's perception and are
"helpful" to the fact-finder. Rule 701, Fed. R. Evid. This
replaces the common-law test that allowed lay testimony in
opinion or conclusion form only if it was "essential." Under
the common law, the opinion or conclusion was inadmissible
unless it was necessary as a kind of shorthand to express a
collection of underlying facts that could not be articulated
separately.
(2) The class of witnesses who can be considered "experts"
is expanded beyond those with formal education and degrees
in the subject under consideration, and now includes people
who gained their special experience or skill in the school of
"hard knocks," namely, through practical, on-the-job experience. Rule 702.
(3) No longer must a matter be totally beyond the knowledge and experience of lay jurors for it to be appropriate for
expert testimony. It is enough that, although lay jurors may
know quite a lot about the subject, an expert could be of some
assistance to them. Rule 702.
(4) The open-court hypothetical question no longer is the
only or even the preferred format for presenting testimony of
an expert who has not personally observed the facts. Alterna-
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tives include (a) facts given to the expert beforehand, perhaps
by the lawyer who expects to present the expert; or (b) facts
obtained by the expert from reading trial or deposition transcripts or listening to witnesses at the trial. Rules 703 and 705.
Rule 615, covering sequestration of witnesses, also must be
considered when this method is used.
(5) Expert witnesses may base their opinions even on
inadmissible evidence, if the court believes such evidence to
be the sort that experts in the field normally and reasonably use
in their practices. Rule 703.
(6) The basis of the expert's opinion (the facts supplied to
him or her and the materials upon which he or she relies) need
not be expressly included in the testimony elicited by the
direct examination. Rule 705.
(7) An expert may give an opinion on the ultimate fact at
issue in the case, as long as the other standards are met. Rule
704.
These liberal rules mean several things. First, there are more
experts and more kinds of experts. Second, experts now may
testify on the conclusive issue and they may not be as "expert"
as they used to be. Moreover, the Advisory Committee on the
Federal Rules of Evidence notes that most former objections,
including weakness of qualifications, now are a matter of
weight rather than admissibility. Finally, experts may be
permitted to use even unreliable material and distorted facts
(perhaps fed to them by a lawyer) and to keep the fact-finder
in the dark about this.
The obvious antidote is to allow extensive discovery of
experts' qualifications, proposed testimony, and bases for
opinions. Indeed, against a background of full discovery, the
relaxed evidentiary rules make sense: They shift some of the
spadework out of the courtroom. Assuming that both lawyers
are competent and forearmed, there is no reason why the
lawyers cannot expose the strengths and weaknesses of expert
testimony to the jury.
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But "forearmed" is the key, and often the difficulty. Discovery is restricted in criminal cases; yet the relaxed evidentiary
rules apply. Disclosur~ is broader on the civil side, but
recently there has been concern about too much discovery in
civil cases, a concern that was codified in 1983 by amending
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, most notably by adding
Rule 26(g). In the words of the Advisory Committee, this rule
"is designed to curb discovery abuse by explicitly encouraging the imposition of sanctions."
More specifically, the rule requires the attorney requesting
discovery to certify that the request is consistent with the
rules; is not interposed for an improper purpose, such as
harassment or bad faith; and is "not unreasonable or unduly
burdensome or expensive, given the needs of the case, the
discovery already had in the case, the amount in controversy,
and the importance of the issues at stake in the litigation." A
companion provision requires-surprisingly for our adversary system-that the attorney consider in this computation
"the limits on (both) parties' resources" and the availability of
the information from other less burdensome, less expensive,
or more convenient sources. Rule 26(b)( 1). If a certification is
made in violation of the rule, the court "shall" impose monetary or other sanctions on the offending party or the party's
attorney. If imposed on the attorney, the sanctions may not be
passed on to the client.
Armed with this comparatively recent amendment, some
lawyers have become enthusiastic about asking for-and
getting-sanctions against other lawyers because somebody
believes that the lawyer has done more discovery than necessary. By couching proper discovery in terms of what is "not
unreasonable or unduly burdensome or expensive" to the
system and to both parties and by tying these considerations
to such factors as the needs of a given case, the amount in
controversy, and the importance of the legal issues, the drafters of the rules have created a significant hazard for the trial
attorney. Should the lawyer try to get as much information as
possible, or should the aim be to curtail efforts in the face of
possible sanctions against the lawyer or the client?
When the lawyer poses this question with respectto discovery about an expert, the expanded scope of the evidentiary
rules heightens the problem. The discovery rules and the
evidentiary rules about expert testimony are on a collision
course, and the trial lawyer is caught in the middle.
Here is a typical scenario.
You are preparing for a civil trial in which you will represent
the defendant. The kind of trial does not really matter, except
that it will involve expert witnesses and it will take place in
federal court or in the courts of one of the many states that have
procedure and evidence rules essentially the same as those that
apply in federal courts.
You have made a request under Rule 26 for information
about your opponent's experts, and have learned (1) the
identity of the plaintiff's expert witness, Harold Jones; (2) that
Jones will render an opinion on X at trial; and (3) the basis for
this opinion. The entire Rule 26 statement was drafted by
opposing counsel. It is somewhat informative, but only barely
above minimal compliance with the rule.
Moreover, the Rule 26 notice is ambiguous about whether
Jones also might venture an opinion on a matter other than X.
The notice contains some general language that could be read
to mean that an opinion on Y might be given, and to give a
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unfolds. I invoke the exception to sequestration recognized
in Rule 615 itself-for"a person whose presence is shown
by a party to be essential to the presentation of his cause."
Judge: I don't think that the presence of your expert is
essential. You've had plenty of opportunity to discover,
evaluate, and consult with your own experts before trial.
Furthermore, I don't think that this case is unusually
technical. And the subjects on which the experts are going
to testify in this case, although important, are not the central
issues. So the presence of your experts is not essential.
Defendant's lawyer: Your Honor, the Advisory Committee Notes to Article VII of the Federal Rules of Evidence state time and again that a major purpose of the
Article is to provide streamlined alternatives to the cumbersome, lengthy, argumentative, and judicially inefficient institution of the open-court hypothetical question to
experts. In particular, Rule 703 provides that the facts used
by an expert "may be those perceived by or made known to
him at or before the hearing," and Rule 705 dispenses with
"prior disclosure" of the facts that the expert is using, the
prior disclosure being the hypothetical question. The
Advisory Committee Notes to these rules express the
intention to allow the expert to receive the facts in ways
other than by the traditional hypothetical question. In
particular, the rules contemplate allowing the expert to
receive the facts by listening to the fact witnesses at trial.
In addition, the rule requiring sequestration, like all
witness sequestration rules, is intended to guard against a
particular danger-namely, that fact witnesses may influence each others' stories without the fact-finder realizing
it. This danger is not present when an expert listens to fact
witnesses and frankly states that his opinion is based on the
assumption that the facts are as the fact witnesses have
testified. The expert makes it clear that he is not testifying
that these facts are true, but only that his opinion is based
on these facts. It is up to the jury to determine whether or
not the facts are true. There is thus no danger of the kind that
Rule 615 addresses.
Judge: Your arguments are good ones, but I have ruled
that sequestration will apply and I will not change my
ruling.

sketchy basis for such an opinion. Arguably, the information
could be seen as complying with the notice rule for Y as well
as for X.
Nevertheless, you decide not to depose Jones. First, a
deposition would be expensive-more so even than a nonexpert deposition, since the federal rules provide that depositions of opposing experts require a court order and also make
it likely that the party taking the deposition will have to pay
certain additional costs. Rule 26(b)(4)(A) and (C). Because
you have good expert help of your own, you feel that you are
able to plan an attack on Jones without a deposition.
Another consideration underlying your decision not to

Experts now may testify
on the conclusive issueand they may not be as
••expert" as they used to be.
depose Expert Jones is your fear that the judge (who at this
stage may not be well-informed of the facts of the case or may
see things differently) might apply the new sanctions provision of Rule 26(g). This provision encourages sanctions
against lawyers themselves if discovery later is deemed by the
judge to have been unnecessary or unduly expensive or
burdensome in light of the circumstances of the case.
Moreover, you believe that the opinion on Yprobably will
not be part of the expert's trial testimony, especially since Y
does not seem central to the case. Indeed, discovery concerning the opinion on Y would be hard to justify to a judge not
thoroughly familiar with the case. Such justification would be
required to obtain a court order for the deposition, and might
also be required to defend against any motion for sanctions for
excessive discovery under Rule 26(g).
Finally, you do not want to be forced to disclose your whole
case in an attempt to justify a deposition of Jones, but that is
exactly what you may be required to do if you litigate the issue.
And if Jones testifies about Y at trial, you conclude that you
will obtain the basis for his opinion without discovery: Jones
will have to disclose the basis during direct examination. Your
experts will be sitting at counsel table, and you can consult
with them regarding Jones's testimony. In addition, you may
be able to convince the judge not to allow Jones to testify at all
on Y, or at least not to allow Jones to give a full basis for his
opinion on Y, since the notice was ambiguous and sketchy.
Once your decision is settled, you sit back and wait for trial to
begin.
The first monkey wrench thrown into your plans is that the
plaintiffs lawyer convinces the judge, pursuant to Rule 615,
Fed. R. Evid., that your experts should not be allowed to
remain in the courtroom during any of the testimony, including the testimony of the plaintiff's expert. A portion of the
argument at the bench might sound like this:
Defendant's lawyer: I respectfully request that my experts be allowed to remain at counsel table, or at least that
one of them be allowed to remain. This is a technical case.
I need to have the advice of my experts as the testimony
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Not a Setback
The judge's decision is a setback, but not a major one, you
think. Your experts still will be available to discuss the issues
between trial sessions, and your familiarity with the technical
issues will enable you to relate the testimony to them. But you
begin to wonder whether you would have been better off
risking sanctions and trying to obtain expert Jones's deposition.
Expert Jones takes the stand and gives his opinion on X,
together with its basis.
The following colloquy then takes place during his direct
examination:
Q. Mr. Jones, do you have an opinion on Y?
Defendant's lawyer: Your Honor, I object. I was not
properly notified that an opinion on Y would be given. I
haven't had a chance to prepare. This is a surprise to me.
Plaintiffs lawyer: Your Honor, I call your attention to
the notice we gave pursuant to Rule 26. It advises of the
possibility of an opinion on Y and gives its basis. In
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addition, under Rule 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence,
the Advisory Committee expressly notes that it has deleted
the notion that surprise can be a ground for exclusion of
otherwise admissible evidence.
Judge: The opinion on Y will be admissible. I think
plaintiff's counsel has complied with his obligation to
notify you of Y.
Defendant's lawyer: Then, Your Honor, I ask for a voir
dire out of the hearing of the jury to explore this expert's
basis for his opinion on Y.
Judge: As you yourself pointed out, Rule 705 does not
require that the basis be given in advance of the expert's
opinion.
Defendant's lawyer: Your Honor, the information given
in the Rule 26 notice from my opponent was hardly
sufficient to give me the basis of this expert's opinion on
Y. I don't know if he personally examined the evidence and
formed his opinion, or if he instead got the facts from the
lawyer. I don't know what facts may have been given to
him, or what kinds of inadmissible or hearsay materials he
may be relying on. He may be relying on third- and fourthhand information from people who had no personal knowledge or who had an interest in the outcome of this case.
Judge: Your objection is overruled. Rule 703 doesn't
preclude an expert from relying on inadmissible material,
as long as it is of the kind that experts in the field reasonably
use. You 'II get your chance to show that it isn't that kind
when you cross-examine. Your arguments simply bear on
weight, not admissibility.
Defendant's lawyer: Well, in the alternative, I would
like to request a continuance now, or at such time as the
witness gives his basis, to prepare to meet this surprise.
Judge: My docket and the number of people waiting to
be heard make that absolutely out of the question. Anyway,
you had notice. Proceed with the direct examination.
Plaintiff's lawyer: Mr. Jones, what is your opinion on Y?
Jones: My opinion on Y is ... (A damning opinion against
the defendant is given in impressive terms. One brief
sentence of superficial reasons is given, with no insight
whatsoever into the expert's basis.)
Plaintiff's lawyer: No further questions.
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Your mind races. You cannot possibly decide whether to
cross-examine or not, and what to ask or not to ask. What
bases or reasons will Jones have? Will your questions
trigger helpful or harmful responses? Are there any weaknesses in Jones: s opinion, oris it so strong you should leave
it alone? If there are weaknesses, what are they? What are
the strong points to leave alone?
Defendant's lawyer: Your Honor, may we approach the
bench? (At the bench:) Your Honor, I've been given
nothing on which to fashion my cross-examination.
Judge: You should have thought of that in discovery.
Rules 703 and 705 provide that the expert need not give you
a basis on direct examination. Rule 705 provides that you
can get it on cross-examination if you want. The expert has
complied with the minimal requirement of Rule 705 that
the expert must give a reason for the opinion.
Defendant's lawyer: No questions of the witness, Your
Honor.
Your decisions during pretrial discovery were reasonable.
Had you not made them, you may have been sanctioned for
unnecessary discovery. Moreover, your legal arguments at
trial were sound. So why are you facing a difficult dilemma?
The primary culprit is the tension between two opposing
drives-the desire to get as much information as possible
about the expert's opinion and the desire to avoid being
punished for what may be viewed as excessive discovery.
Indeed, in light of the new standard of Rule 26(g), lawyers
must think seriously not only about what is good for their own
case and client, but also about the economic and practical
impact of discovery on their opponent.
The passage of the recent amendments to Rule 26 marked
a dramatic break with the past. For example, in the 1970
amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the
Advisory Committee had stated that in cases presenting "intricate and delicate issues as to which expert testimony is
likely to be determinative ... a prohibition against discovery
of information held by expert witnesses produces in acute
form the very evils that discovery was created to prevent.
Effective cross-examination of an expert witness requires
advance preparation."
By contrast, the more recent amendments take an entirely
different approach: "Concern about discovery abuse led to
widespread recognition that there is a need for more aggressive judicial control and supervision." Discovery of experts
was perceived as one part of the problem.

Get It at Trial
The defense attorney in our trial scenario, caught between
the objectives of getting information about the opposing
expert's opinions and avoiding the risk of discovery sanctions, thought the answer that would accomplish both objectives was to get the missing information from the expert at
trial. The problem with this solution was that, while discovery
was being restricted, expert trial testimony was being expanded. In other words, the Federal Rules of Evidence had
blocked the doorway to discovery during trial.
The changes in the Federal Rules of Evidence may well
have been based on the assumption that information regarding
the expert and his or her opinion would be readily available
through discovery. The Evidence Advisory Committee, in
(Please turn to page 56)
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Affidavit
Evidence
(Continued from page 44)
I Wigmore On Evidence § 4 (Tillers
rev. 1983) contains a valuable discussion of the evidentiary status of affidavits in ex-parte proceedings and motion
hearings that Wigmore styled "adversary interlocutory proceedings." Professor Wigmore believed that the rules
of evidence should not apply in a hearing on a request for preliminary equitable relief. Wigmore, § 4 at 44-45.
Professor Moore goes farther, contending that a court "may properly consider
affidavits at the preliminary injunction
hearing, which do not measure up to the
standards of the summary judgment
affidavit. ... " 7 Moore's Federal Practice (Part 2), § 65.04[3) at 65-88.
(Summary judgment affidavits, according to Rule 56(e), "shall set forth such
facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that
the affiant is competent to testify to the
matters stated therein.") Professor Tillers, however, claims the evidence rules
do apply. He invokes, among other
things, Rule IIOI(b), Fed. R. Evid.,
which states that the rules of evidence
apply "generally to civil actions and
proceedings .... "Footnote 16 of Wigmore§ 4.

A Red-Faced Court
Isn't Professor Tillers on thin ice
claiming that no rule allows the use of an
affidavit in connection with a hearing on
the merits regarding a preliminary injunction? What about Rule 43(e), Fed.
R. Civ. P.? See Murray v. Kunzig, 462
F.2d 871, 878-879 (D.C. Cir. 1972),
reversed on other grounds sub. nom.
Sampson v. Murray4I5 U.S. 61 (1974).
For that matter, Rule 6(d), Fed. R. Civ.
P. (providing for the time of serving
affidavits relating to motions), assumes
that factual matters relating to motions
may be raised by way of affidavit.
While on the subject of"affidavits," it
is worth noting that a somewhat redfaced Ninth Circuit had to withdraw its
decision in Zepeda v. United States
Immigration & Naturalization Service,
36 Fed. Rules Serv. 2d 906, 911, 708

F.2d 355 (9th Cir. 1983), withdrawn,
amended opinion issued 40 Fed. Rules
Serv. 2d 1285, 753 F.2d 719 (9th Cir.
1985). The original opinion had trumpeted that unsworn declarations, even if
made under penalty of perjury, were not
proper "affidavits" within the meaning
of Rule 43(e), Fed. R. Civ. P., in support
of a preliminary injunction. This gaffe
was silently dropped from the amended
version.
Numerous cases fly in the face of
Professor Tillers's theory that affidavits
cannot be relied upon for preliminary
injunctions. See Federal Savings &
Loan Insurance Corp. v. Dixon, 835
F.2d 554, 558 (5th Cir. 1987), and
S.E.C. v. Musella, 578 F. Supp. 425
(S.D.N.Y. 1984). See also United States
v. Fox, 211 F. Supp. 25, 30 (E.D. La.
1962), aff'd., 334 F.2d 449 (5th Cir.
1964):
.. .in a proceeding for preliminary
injunction oral testimony, although permissible, is not absolutely required. The court may
receive and consider both affidavits and other documents which
are the equivalent of affidavits.
But when the fur begins to fly in the
form of conflicting affidavits and counteraffidavits, the appellate courts become restive without more trustworthy
evidence in the record. See Fengler v.
Numismatic Americana, Inc., 832 F.2d
745 (2d Cir. 1987). See also 11 Wright
& Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil § 2949 at 480. Judge
Godbold's decision in Marshall Durbin
Farms, Inc. v. National Farmers Org.,
Inc., 446 F.2d 353 (5th Cir. 1971), canvasses these problems. That court set
aside a preliminary injunction obtained
with the help of a "flood of additional
affidavits" (446 F.2d at 353) deluged on
opposing counsel at the last minute in
violation of Rule 6(d), which the court
found applicable to motions for preliminary injunctions (446 F.2d at 358).
Some of these offending affidavits were
on "information and belief."
In the final analysis, Ko-Ko's evidentiary proposal to Nanki-Poo was superficially in accord with the stricter standard for a summary judgment affidavit a
Ia Rule 56(e), Fed. R. Civ. P. It contemplated the affiant's vivid, eyewitness
account of the execution. Nonetheless,
it was grossly tainted, as cross-examination or even a prehearing deposition
would have revealed:
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Ko-Ko: Here are plenty of witnesses-the Lord Chief Justice, Lord
High Admiral, Commander-in-Chief,
Secretary of State for the Home Department, First Lord of the Treasury, and
Chief Commissioner of Police.
Nanki-Poo: But where are they?
Ko-Ko: There they are. They'll all
sweartoit-won'tyou?(ToPooh-Bah.)
Pooh-Bah: Am I to understand that all
of us high Officers of State are required
to perjure ourselves to ensure your
safety?
Ko-Ko: Why not? You 'II be grossly
insulted, as usual.
Pooh-Bah: Will the insult be cash
down, or at a date?
Ko-Ko: It will be a ready-money
transaction. ~

Collision
(Continued from page 20)
drafting the expert testimony provisions
of the Federal Rules of Evidence, expressly predicated their work on the
liberal availability of discovery:
(Article VII) assumes that the
cross-examiner has the advance
knowledge which is essential for
effective cross-examination ....
Rule 26(b)(4) of the (Federal)
Rules of Civil Procedure (as then
constituted) provides for substantial discovery in this area, obviating in large measure the obstacles
which have been raised in some
instances to discovery of findings,
underlying data, and even the
identity of experts.
The drafters' intentions may have
been noble, but the drafters did not foresee the future. They did not predict the
change of heart about discovery in civil
cases. They did not anticipate the 1983
amendments to the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, which made discovery,
including discovery of experts, more
difficult and even perilous. (And they
seem to have overlooked altogether the
situation of restricted discovery that has
always existed in criminal cases.)
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
and the Federal Rules of Evidence are on

a collision course. Each assumes that the
other body of rules will make available
the information necessary to expose
false prophets masquerading as experts.
Both are mistaken.
Several steps can be taken to avoid the
dilemma faced by the trial lawyer in our
example.

Learn About the Expert
(l) First, and most obviously, the attorney might seek more exhaustive pretrial disclosure. In arguing that pretrial
discovery of an expert's opinion is not
excessive, the attorney should point out
that Rules 703 and 705 may prevent
disclosure at trial of the information
underlying the expert's opinion. Consequently, pretrial discovery may be the
only way to determine the basis of your
opponent's expert testimony.
(2) If expert disclosure is inadequate
for whatever reason, the lawyer should
consider filing a motion to exclude all or
part of the expert's testimony. Rule 403
of the Federal Rules of Evidence codifies the trial judge's discretionary power
to exclude any otherwise admissible
evidence because it is prejudicial, time
consuming, misleading, or cumulative.
Surprise, a permissible ground for
exclusion under prior law, is conspicuously absent from the list in Rule 403.
But it may be there in some other language. In arguing for the exclusion of
some or all of an expert's testimony, the
attorney should use words that are in the
rule to express the same thought. Thus,
the attorney should argue that there is a
danger of "prejudice" or of "misleading
the jury"-that evidence the lawyer was
not able to study, evaluate, and prepare
for may appear to be stronger than it
really is, since the weaknesses will not
be shown.
This is particularly true with expert
testimony, which has an extraordinary
effect on the jury and which the jury
cannot effectively evaluate without
help. Further, the attorney should argue
that the Federal Rules of Evidence
Advisory Committee expressly predicated deletion of "surprise" on the
grounds that there will no longer be
surprise, because of discovery and continuances-neither of which occurred
in our trial scenario. Remember, though,
that the discovery rules in the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure do allow exclusion of "surprise" evidence if the
surprise is due to failure of the introduc-

ing party to comply with discovery.
(3) In addition to the arguments made
in our hypothetical, five points can be
raised to strengthen the attorney's request at trial for the basis of the expert's
opinion:
(a) Rule 705 expressly gives the
judge discretion to depart from its
ordinary proscription and to require
earlier disclosure of the basis of an
expert opinion. No standards are
provided for the exercise of that discretion, but a good argument in its
favor is that full information forming
the basis of the opinion has not been
given in discovery. Emphasize that it
is virtually impossible to fashion a
proper cross-examination and enlighten the jury about any weaknesses in the expert testimony without having the basis of the opinion in
advance. Point out that, in this situ-

ation, cross-examination probably
will not be attempted-not because
the opinion is sound, but because of
uncertainty about what the witness
will say.
(b) Rule 705 does not, in so many
words, expressly prohibit voir dire.
That is only an inference from its
provision that the opinion may be
given "without prior disclosure" of
basis, "unless the judge requires otherwise." Argue that voir dire should
be allowed to enable you to learn the
basis of the expert's opinion.
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(c) While Rule 705 dispenses with
the requirement of prior disclosure of
basis, that is, before the opinion is
given, the rule does not address disclosure during the direct exam but
after the opinion is given. Disclosing
basis at that time still may be required. Again, argue that disclosure
by way of voir dire may solve the
problems created by the tension between discovery and evidentiary
rules. Although not an ideal solution
for the attorney opposing the expert,
it is better than leaving matters until
cross-examination. The disclosure of
basis may take place out of the jury's
hearing, and could result in the opinion being stricken (or at least weakened) immediately.
(d) Rule 705 provides that "[t]he
expert may testify in terms of opinion
or inference and give his reasons
therefore without prior disclosure of
the underlying facts or data, unless
the court requires otherwise." "Reasons" could and perhaps should be
read to embrace much more of what
the expert uses to reach his conclusion than was given in our trial scenario.
(e) Important policy considerations favor allowing prior discovery
of expert information: As a result of
not getting the information about
basis in advance of cross-examination, the lawyer may decide to forego
cross or may conduct an inadequate
cross. Either of these alternatives
serves the system badly. An unexplored or inadequately explored (and
thus perhaps faulty) opinion may get
to the jury. In the absence of good
exploration, this opinion may appear
deceptively forceful.
(4) Finally, as a last resort, cite the
practice of a number of federal district
judges who prohibit testimony that is
substantially greater than the statement
furnished pursuant to pretrial discovery.
The dilemma of the trial attorney may
not be completely solved by broadening
the scope of pretrial discovery relating
to expert witnesses. But finding ways to
obtain the expert's opinion and basis
beforehand will go a long way toward
giving the lawyer the tools essential to
turning the battle with the expert witness
into a fair fight.
In the words of our opening allegory,
it may give the lawyer a full-length
sword. l!:;l
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